NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT

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Monterey, to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

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REMOVAL JURISDICTION

- 1. Legal Framework. This Court has original jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §1332 because this action involves citizens of different states and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. In support of this removal, Defendants make the following showing:
- 2. Plaintiff's Complaint. On August 1, 2007, Plaintiff LisaMarie Brayden ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California in the County of Monterey, entitled LisaMarie Brayden v. PSC Industrial Outsourcing, Inc. et al., Case No. M 85575 ("Complaint"). A copy of the Complaint is attached as  ${\bf Exhibit}~{\bf A}$  to the Declaration of Sharon Rossi ("Rossi Decl."). The Complaint purports to allege two causes of action: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy and Government Code section 12940 et seq. and (2) sexual harassment.
- Service of Complaint. Defendants received notice of this lawsuit on or about August 22, 2007, when Defendant Hamby was served a copy of the Summons and Complaint. Defendant PSC, was also served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint on August 29 , 2007. Defendant Robinson received a copy of the Complaint on or about August 24, 2007. He has not been served with the Complaint, but voluntarily agreed to appear in this action on September 20, 2007. Plaintiff has not yet served Defendant Blanchard with the Complaint.

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- Answer Filed in Superior Court. Defendants PSC, Hamby and Robinson filed their Answer to the Complaint in the Monterey County Superior Court on or about September 20, 2007. See Exhibit B to Rossi Decl.
- Removal is Timely. This Notice of Removal is filed within 30 days of the first date of receipt of a copy of the filed Complaint by any Defendant. Thus, removal is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(a).

## DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

- 6. Grounds for Jurisdiction. This is a civil action of which this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and is one which may be removed to this Court by Defendants pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), in that it is a civil action between citizens of different states wherein the amount in controversy is in excess of the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars (\$75,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs.
- Plaintiff's Citizenship. Defendants are informed and 7. believe that Plaintiff is, and has been at all times since the commencement of this action, a citizen and resident of the State of California, Stanislaus County. See DFEH Complaint attached as **Exhibit A** to Rossi Decl. For diversity purposes, a person is a "citizen" of the state in which he is domiciled. Kantor v. Wellesly Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). A party's residence is prima facie evidence of her domicile. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 29 F.3d 514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994).

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- 8. Defendant PSC. Plaintiff names PSC as a Defendant in each of her two causes of action. Complaint,  $\P\P$  5-15 and 16-18. PSC, was at the time of the filing of this action, incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business and headquarters located in Houston, Texas. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."
- 9. Defendant Robinson. Plaintiff names Robinson as a Defendant in each of her two causes of action. Complaint,  $\P\P$  5-15 and 16-18. Robinson, was at the time of the filing of this action, and still is domiciled in the State of Washington, and is thus, a citizen of Washington. See Kantor, 704 F.2d at 1090.
- Defendant Blanchard. Plaintiff names Blanchard as a Defendant in each of her two causes of action. Blanchard is Plaintiff's former supervisor. Blanchard, was at the time of the filing of this action, and still is domiciled in the State of Louisiana, and is thus, a citizen of Louisiana. See id.
- 11. Defendant Hamby. Although Plaintiff only references Hamby in one line of her Complaint (i.e.,  $\P$  3, line 26), Plaintiff also names Hamby as a Defendant in each of her two causes of action. Complaint,  $\P\P$  5-15 and 16-18. Hamby is the site manager of the PSC San Ardo facility, where Plaintiff worked. Hamby, was at the time of the filing of this action, and still is domiciled in California, and is thus, a citizen of California. See Kantor, 704 F.2d at 1090.

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- 12. Joinder of Hamby is Fraudulent. For the reasons explained in paragraphs 13-15 below, Hamby is not properly named as party because Plaintiff cannot establish liability against him. A defendant, who has been fraudulently joined, such as Hamby, must be disregarded for removal purposes. McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that discharged employee failed to state cause of action against individual supervisors, under California law, and thus their joinder as defendants was sham and their presence did not destroy diversity); see also Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 460 (E.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 710 F. 2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983) (court may disregard joinder and retain jurisdiction where joinder of non-diverse defendant is only a fraudulent device to prevent removal).
- Plaintiff's Claims Against Hamby are Not Actionable. The causes of action against Defendant Hamby are (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy and Government Code section 12940 et seq. and (2) sexual harassment. None of these claims are actionable as to this individual Defendant.
- 14. Wrongful Termination Claims are Not Actionable Against Supervisors. "[I]n California it is well established that, '[a]s a matter of law, only an employer can be liable for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy." Beckv. FedEx Ground, 2007 WL 2028581, \*3 )(E.D.Cal.2007)(quoting Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Med. Group, 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 53 (2003)). Because Plaintiff was employed exclusively by PSC, none of the individual Defendants, including Hamby, can be held liable as to the second cause of action. Thus, as a matter

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of law, Plaintiff first cause of action against Hamby is wholly without merit. As such, Plaintiff has fraudulently joined Hamby as a Defendant in her first cause of action. McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339 (providing, "If the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a [ ] defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the joinder of the [ ] defendant is fraudulent.")

15. Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment Claim Against Hamby is Wholly Devoid of Merit. Equally spurious is the second cause of action against Hamby, for sexual harassment. Plaintiff alleges that Blanchard sexual harassed her by, inter alia "assaulting her on two occasions by pulling out her top and peering down at her breasts, and by grabbing her forcefully by the buttocks." Complaint,  $\P$  7. Plaintiff, however, does not make any specific allegations against Hamby in regards to this cause of action. In fact, in her Complaint, Plaintiff makes only one reference to Hamby as follows: "Defendant Joe Hanby, [sic.] at all times relevant hereto, was the Site manager at the same facility." Complaint,  $\P$  3. There are no other factual allegations as to Hamby to even remotely suggest that he ever engaged in any sexually harassing conduct toward Plaintiff, or engaged in any alleged inappropriate conduct whatsoever. Instead, she simply concludes that "Defendants and each of them and/or their agents/employees sexually harassed plaintiff and/or failed to take immediate and appropriate and appropriate corrective action." Complaint,  $\P$ 17. This is insufficient to state a cause of action against Hamby. Supervisors cannot be vicariously liable acts of the subordinates. See CIV. CODE § 2351 ("agent is

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not responsible to third persons for the acts of the subagent"). Furthermore, supervisory employees cannot be held liable for failing to take action to prevent the sexual harassment of a subordinate employee. Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1326 (1996) (stating "a supervisory employee owes no duty to his or her subordinate employee to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. That is a duty owed only by the employer. . . We conclude a supervisory employee is not personally liable under the FEHA as an aider and abettor of harassment for failing to prevent the sexual harassment of a subordinate employee")(internal citations omitted). Plaintiff has fraudulently joined Defendant in her second cause of action as well. See McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339.

- 16. Doe Defendants. The presence of Doe defendants in this case has no bearing on diversity with respect to removal. purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
- 17. The Amount In Controversy Exceeds the Jurisdictional Limit. The amount in controversy in this action, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars (\$75,000). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered and continues to suffer damages, including "embarrassment, humiliation, fear for her safety, emotional distress, loss of past and future earnings and earning capacity,

Notably, Plaintiff's failure to specify the amount of damages sought in the Complaint does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction. See White v. J.C. Penny Life Ins. Co., 861 F. Supp. 25, 26 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (defendant may remove suit to federal court notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to plead a specific dollar amount in controversy; if rules were otherwise, "any plaintiff could avoid removal simply by declining ... to place a specific dollar value on its claim").

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employment benefits, medical and other special damages according to proof." Complaint,  $\P\P$  13 and 18. Additionally, Plaintiff prays for punitive damages. Complaint,  $\P$  15 and pq. 5, line 7. Requests for punitive damages must be taken into account in ascertaining the amount in controversy. Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Assn., 325 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1963). Finally, Plaintiff prays for attorneys' fees and costs. Complaint, pg. 5, line 6. If attorneys' fees are recoverable by statute or contract, then the fees claim is included in determining the amount in controversy. Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945 (1982).

In determining whether a complaint meets the amount in controversy threshold of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a court should consider the aggregate value of claims for compensatory and punitive damages. See, e.g., Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 241 (1943) (amount in controversy requirement met if plaintiff "might recover" award of compensatory and punitive damages in excess of amount in controversy requirement). Accordingly, Plaintiff's alleged economic, compensatory, and punitive damages bring the total amount in controversy to a sum exceeding \$75,000. The amount in controversy requirement is satisfied because it is "more likely than not" that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996).

18. This Court Possess Original Jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), this Court possesses original jurisdiction

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over this action because it involves an amount in controversy in excess of \$75,000 and is between citizens of different states. Consequently, the case is properly removed to this Court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

## **VENUE**

19. Venue lies in the Northern District of California. This action was originally brought in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Monterey. All of the alleged wrongful conduct which Plaintiff complains of took place in San Ardo, California, which is located in Monterey County. Complaint,  $\P$  1. A civil action founded on diversity jurisdiction may be venued in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the wrongful conduct occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Monterey County is part of the Northern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 84(a). Accordingly, venue is proper.

## NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF AND STATE COURT

Compliance with 28 U.S.C.§ 1446(d). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Defendants, concurrently with filing this Notice of Removal, is filing a Notice of Removal with the Clerk of the Superior Court for the County of Monterey. In addition, Defendants are serving Plaintiff's Counsel with a copy of the Notice of Removal. See Exhibits C to Rossi Decl.

WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the above action now pending before the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Monterey be removed to this Court.

DATED: September 21, 2007 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Ongerth Rossi Shaixon . Attorneys for Defendants PSC INDUSTRIAL OUTSOURCING, INC., BRUCE ROBINSON AND JOE HAMBY 

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